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This paper analyzes prominence in a homogeneous product market where two rms
simultaneously choose both prices and price complexity levels. Complexity limits competing
o¤ers comparability and results in consumer confusion. Confused consumers are more
likely to buy from the prominent rm. In equilibrium there is dispersion in both prices
and price complexity. The nature of equilibrium depends on prominence. Compared to its
rival, the prominent rm makes higher prot, associates a smaller price range with lowest
complexity, puts lower probability on lowest complexity, and sets a higher average price.
However, higher prominence may benet consumers and, conditional on choosing lowest
complexity, the prominent rms average price is lower, which is consistent with confused
consumersbias.
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Price complexity is a common feature of many markets, including those for retail nancial and
banking products, and retail supply of gas and electricity. It stems from the use of multi-part
tari¤s or partitioned prices, involved or technical language, or di¤erent price formats or informa-
tion disclosure methods. A main concern is that complex pricing sties competition by making
it harder for consumers to understand rmso¤ers and by limiting product comparability.
The 2015 UK Competition and Market Authority investigation of the retail banking market
found that [t]here are barriers to accessing and assessing information on Personal Current
Account charges and overdraft charges are particularly di¢ cult to compare across banks,
due to both the complexity and diversity of the bankscharging structures.1 The 2011 report
by the UK Independent Commission on Banking mentions evidence that complexity in pricing
structures makes it di¢ cult for consumers to receive good value. The 2007 EC study of EU
mortgage credit markets and Woodward and Halls 2012 study of US mortgage markets echo
these concerns.2
Price complexity increases the time (or e¤ort) consumers need to make a choice and the
level of cognitive abilities and sophistication required to identify the best deal. So, it may
lead to consumer confusion and allow homogeneous product sellers to soften price competition
and increase their prots.3 Experimental research indicates that more fragmented multi-part
tari¤s can create confusion and lead to suboptimal consumer choices (see, for instance, Kalayci
and Potters, 2011, and Kalayci, 2015). These ndings are consistent with evidence from the
marketing literature that partitioned (or involved) pricing makes it di¢ cult for consumers
to compare competing o¤ers (Greenleaf et al., 2013, reviews related work).4 Evidence of
behavioral biases has also been found in US retail nance products (mortgage brokerage, loans,
and credit card services) by Woodward and Hall (2012) and Stango and Zinman (2009a, 2009b).
In some markets where price complexity limits the comparability of competing o¤ers, the
choices of confused consumers are a¤ected by rm prominence, which may be due to higher
1Similarly, in the market for business current accounts while price information is available, it is di¢ cult for
SMEs to compare fees across banksand this is due to complex tari¤ structures, amongst other factors. See
the 2015 Summary of Provisional Findings Report of the Retail Banking Market Investigation.
2Carlin (2009) discusses empirical evidence of price complexity in nancial markets and concludes that many
of the households who purchase retail nancial products do not understand what they are buying and how much
they are paying for these goods.
3When facing complex tari¤s/markets, some consumers may rationally opt out of information processing due
to its high cost. Or, they may be unable to deal with the complexity because they have poor numeracy skills
and/or misjudge the information.
4See also Estelami (1997), Morwitz, Greenleaf, and Johnson (1998), and Thomas and Morwitz (2009).
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brand recognition (e.g., for a pioneer or incumbent product or an intensely advertised one), to
product recommendations made by an expert, agent, or other consumers, to a more salient lo-
cation (at eye-level, in a display, or at the top of an online search-outcome list), or to consumers
loyalty to an already familiar brand.5 For instance, consumers who shop for a mortgage or for
insurance may be biased towards considering their current-account bank. In retail energy mar-
kets that were previously monopolized, consumers may favor the familiarregional incumbent
over new entrants (see Giulietti, Waterson, and Wildenbeest, 2014, for evidence from British
electricity markets).6
This paper explores the relationship between price complexity as an obfuscation device and
rm prominence and its implications in otherwise homogeneous product markets. We analyze
the impact of prominence on rmspricing and complexity choices and on market outcomes,
and build on the interplay between complexity and prominence to propose a conceptual micro-
foundation for consumer confusion. In our model, a prominent seller and its rival compete for a
unit mass of identical consumers with unit demands. Firms simultaneously and independently
choose both their prices and price-complexity levels. The timing reects the fact that in many
environments, including banking and nancial markets, rms can change relatively easily the
price formats or the technical language employed in their price disclosures.
We formalize price complexity by allowing each rm to select a level from a closed interval. A
rms choice of complexity a¤ects consumersability to understand its price o¤er and, although
it does not a¤ect the complexity of the rivals price, it may limit the comparability of competing
o¤ers. More precisely, a marginal increase in a rms complexity level increases the share of
confused consumers in the market. So, complexity a¤ects market composition: some consumers
are experts, while others are confused. Confused consumers are unable to compare the rms
prices and make random choices, but are relatively more likely to select the prominent product
as it enjoys higher recognition.7 In Carlin (2009), confused consumers make random choices,
so each rm is equally likely to be selected. In this respect, our model is an asymmetric version
of his and an extension where we explore alternative confusion technologies generalizes his
ndings. In our benchmark model, the experts purchase the lowest-price product, but we also
5Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009) review empirical evidence on prominence.
6 In an analysis of Mexicos private social security market, Hastings, Hortaçsu, and Syverson (2017) show
that rms advertising and sales spending (which can be related to prominence) a¤ects the choices of low-
income or price-inelastic consumers. Using household-level data from the Texas residential electricity market,
Hortaçsu, Madanizadeh, and Puller (2017) show that inattention and incumbent brandsadvantages are sources
of consumer inertia.
7Due to confusion, the confused may use intermediaries who steer them towards the prominent product, may
rely on persuasive advertisements, or may have stronger default biases.
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discuss a variant where they are biased towards the prominent product.
In this setting, rms have to balance conicting incentives when setting their prices: to
compete aggressively for the experts and to exploit the confused. In equilibrium, this friction
rules out pure strategy pricing, so both rms randomize on prices. The prominent rm also
randomizes between the lowest and the highest price complexity levels and, for moderate levels
of prominence, so does the less prominent seller. However, if the prominence level is high
enough, the less prominent seller chooses the lowest complexity for sure as it benets more
from market transparency. In equilibrium, whenever a rm randomizes on complexity, there is
a positive relationship between prices and complexity levels.8 When setting a low price, a rm
benets from a lower complexity level as this is associated with a higher fraction of experts. In
contrast, when a rm sets a high price, it may benet from choosing a high complexity level,
provided that it serves a large enough fraction of confused consumers.
The rmsequilibrium mixed price and complexity strategies reect the di¤erences in prod-
uct salience. The prominent seller makes higher prots, chooses the highest price-complexity
level with higher probability than the rival, sets a lower cut-o¤ price below which prices are as-
sociated with the lowest complexity, and chooses the monopoly price with positive probability.
As it sells to a larger share of confused consumers, the salient rm is more likely to choose high
complexity and also, for a given complexity level, its incentive to set a high price is stronger.
The less prominent sellers price is always below the monopoly level and its average price is
lower than that of the rival.
In our model, an increase in prominence may lead to lower industry prots and so con-
sumers could be better o¤ in a market where one rm is salient enough. Intuitively, for high
enough prominence, the less salient rm chooses the lowest complexity for sure and competes
more aggressively in prices. This suggests that in markets where less prominent rms (e.g.
new entrants) can increase the relative prominence of their products (for instance, through
advertising investments or sales e¤orts), this could be detrimental to consumers. Giulietti,
Waterson, and Wildenbeest (2014) show that, between 2002 and 2005, in the British electricity
market, the lower the share of households buying electricity through the incumbents (which
enjoy higher prominence at regional level), the less competitively the market entrants behave.
Furthermore, we show that, conditional on choosing lowest complexity, the prominent rms
average price is lower. Therefore, when consumers are most able to understand the rmsprices
8Armstrong and Chen (2009) and Chioveanu (2012) identify positive relationships between prices and product
qualities in models where rms randomize on both dimensions.
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(when complexity is lowest), the prominent rm appears to be o¤ering a better deal. In this
sense, confused consumersbias for the prominent seller is consistent with the ranking of the
average prices conditional on low complexity.
We show that our qualitative results are robust in a modied model where expert consumers
are biased towards the prominent rms product (i.e. willing to pay a premium for it so
long as the price is below their valuation).9 Using an example, we illustrate the existence
of an equilibrium where rms randomize on both prices and price complexity levels, there is
a positive relationship between prices, and - conditional on choosing the lowest complexity
level - the prominent rms average price is lower. We also show that such a mixed strategy
equilibrium exists for more general confusion technologies whenever the marginal e¤ect of a
rms price complexity increases in the rivals complexity choice.
In spite of their prevalence, price complexity and prominence have only recently received
attention in the economics literature. Carlin (2009) analyzes a homogeneous product market
where identical rms compete in both prices and price complexity levels, and where confused
consumers make random choices, so each rm is equally likely to be selected. His ndings are
consistent with observed patterns in retail nancial markets, such as price dispersion, positive
mark-ups, and higher prices in more fragmented environments. Our analysis incorporates
prominence into his framework and focuses on its interaction with complexity. Gu and Wenzel
(2014) analyze consumer protection policy in a model where two rms compete in prices after
committing to an obfuscation level. In their model, unlike ours, obfuscation is a long-run
decision so it could be related, for instance, to product design rather than price format which
may be changed relatively easily.10 Allowing for prominence, they show that in equilibrium
the salient rm chooses the highest obfuscation level for sure, while the rivals (deterministic)
choice depends on the market conditions.
In a duopoly models where rms compete in prices and price-frames, Piccione and Spiegler
(2012) study the impact of frame-structure on market outcomes. Chioveanu and Zhou (2013)
explore in a unied framework the e¤ects of both price complexity and price presentation format
di¤erentiation as sources of consumer confusion. We show that the nature of the equilibrium
depends on the source of confusion and that in oligopoly markets a standard competition policy
9An alternative interpretation of this extension is that consumers exhibit a default bias and, although the
experts can correctly compare prices, they face a switching cost.
10See also Ellison and Wolitzky (2012), Wilson (2010), and Taylor (2017) for search-cost models of obfuscation.
The latter explores an alternative rationale for obfuscation: raising browsingcosts allows rms to target better
merchandising e¤orts by excluding from the market window-shopperswho are unlikely to purchase.
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approach may have undesired e¤ects.
In a sequential search model where all consumers sample rst one salient rm, Armstrong,
Vickers, and Zhou (2009) demonstrate that, with homogeneous products, the prominent rm
sets a lower price than its rivals, industry prots are higher, and consumer surplus and welfare
lower than in a market where rms are equally prominent. They also show that prominence
benets both sellers and consumers when products are vertically di¤erentiated (as the highest-
quality producer has the strongest incentive to become salient) and discuss the empirical rel-
evance of prominence. Armstrong and Zhou (2011) explore ways in which a rm can become
prominent. More specically, intermediaries may steer consumers to one rm for a fee, price
advertisements may a¤ect the order in which rmso¤ers are sampled, or consumersdefault
biases may be a source of prominence.11
In our clearinghouse setting, the order of search is irrelevant but prominence a¤ects the
behavior of consumers who are confused by price complexity. With both complexity and
prominence, consumersperceptions of prices may be biased as they may ignore the involved
prices they cannot understand and take into account only those prices that are presented in
less complex formats. In our model, a bias in favor of the prominent seller is consistent with
such a myopicassessment. We focus on environments where rms commonly employ complex
prices, for example, consumer banking and energy retail markets. Prominence might be driven
by default biases favouring the product under consideration or related ones or it may be due
to persuasive advertising or marketing ploys which could make a rms product salient in a
consumers mind and so more likely to be considered.
By considering the interplay between complexity and prominence in a model with consumer
confusion, this study contributes to an emerging literature that explores the interaction between
boundedly rational consumers and strategic rms. See Ellison (2006), Spiegler (2011), Huck
and Zhou (2011), Grubb (2015), and Spiegler (2016) for related discussions and surveys of
recent work. Our model is also related to the literature on price dispersion (see Baye, Morgan,
and Scholten, 2006, for a review) and explores a market where rms simultaneously choose
prices and complexity, and randomize in both dimensions.
11 In a model with product di¤erentiation, Rhodes (2011) shows that a prominent rm chooses a lower price
and makes higher prots, even when search is almost costless. See also Armstrong (2017) for a recent review of
the ordered search literature.
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2 Model
Consider a market for a homogeneous product with two sellers, rms 1 and 2. The rms face
zero marginal costs of production. There is a unit mass of consumers, each demanding at most
one unit of the product and willing to pay up to v = 1. The rms compete by simultaneously
and independently choosing prices (p1 and p2) and price complexity levels (k1 and k2). The
timing reects the fact that in many cases both complexity and prices can be changed relatively
easily. The level of complexity ki captures how di¢ cult it is for consumers to assess the price
of rm i and a¤ects the comparability of competing o¤ers. The rms set prices pi 2 [0; 1] and
can choose any complexity level ki 2 [k; k]  R+ free of cost.
Depending on rmscomplexity choices, some consumers may nd it di¢ cult to correctly
compare the competing price o¤ers. More precisely, for given k1 and k2, a fraction (k1; k2)  1
of the consumers are able to accurately compare the price o¤ers and select the best deal (we refer
to these as the expertsor informed), but the remaining 1 (k1; k2) consumers are confused
and make random choices, which may be biased due to rm prominence. Let (k1; k2) 2 C2.
If one rm unilaterally increases the complexity of its price, this lowers the fraction of expert
consumers in the market (@=@ki < 0, for i = 1; 2), but does not a¤ect the marginal impact
of the rivals price complexity on consumers (@2=@k1@k2 = 0). For simplicity, we assume
that (k1; k2) = 1 i¤ k1 = k2 = k. That is, nobody gets confused if both rms choose
the lowest complexity level k, in which case all consumers buy the cheaper product.12 In
section 5 we explore the robustness of our results for alternative confusion technologies with
@2=@k1@k2 > 0.
We focus on the interaction between price complexity and rm prominence. In our model,
prominence is exogenous (it may be due, for instance, to higher rm recognition or perceived
trustworthiness) and has an impact on product choice when consumers are confused by price
complexity. It also a¤ects the choice of informed consumers if the two rms o¤er the same
price.13 More specically, without loss of generality, rm 1 is a prominent seller and the
consumers who are unable to compare the prices due to complexity are more likely to purchase
its product. That is, a fraction  2 (1=2; 1) of the confused consumers buy from rm 1 and
the remaining 1    buy from rm 2. Similarly, if both rms o¤er the same price, a fraction
12This is without loss of generality so long as the monotonicity assumptions in the text are satised.
13Firm prominence can be itself a source of confusion. For instance, this may be the case in pharmaceutical
markets where some consumers prefer branded products to generic drugs with identical composition. However,
here we explore confusion due to price complexity.
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 2 (1=2; 1) of the experts buy from rm 1 and the remaining 1    buy from rm 2. As a
result, rms prots are
i(pi; pj ; ki; kj) = pi  [qi(pi; pj)(ki; kj) + si(1  (ki; kj))] ;
where qi(pi; pj) is given by
qi(pi; pj) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1; if pi < pj and pi  1
si; if pi = pj  1
0; if pi > pj or pi > 1
for i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6= j ;
with s1 =  > 1=2 and s2 = 1  .
We assume that the confused are unable to compare the rmso¤ers, however they do not
pay more than their reservation price (v = 1).14 One interpretation is that consumers have
a budget constraint and realize at checkout (or after purchase) if a products price exceeds
their valuation and can decline to buy or return the product. Knowing this, rms do not have
incentives to set prices above consumersvaluation.15 In our model, for simplicity, confused
consumers choices are a¤ected by complexity and prominence, but are independent of how
the two rmsprices rank overall. This captures the idea that confusion in price comparisons
reduces consumersprice sensitivity and weakens price competition. Also, consumers do not
have an opportunity to learn and infer prices from a rms complexity choice. This is more
relevant in mortgage or nancial services markets, for example, where the consumers participate
infrequently. Moreover, in our setting, confused consumersbias in favour of the prominent
rm is consistent with the ranking of the average prices associated with the lowest complexity.
3 Preliminary Analysis
We start by analyzing rmsprice and complexity choices when the price format limits the
comparability of competing o¤ers and one rm is prominent. All proofs missing from the text
are relegated to the appendix, unless specied otherwise. The following two results rule out
the existence of pure strategy equilibria.
Lemma 1 There is no equilibrium where both rms choose pure price-complexity strategies.
14Carlin (2009), Piccione and Spiegler (2012), and Chioveanu and Zhou (2013) also make this assumption.
15Nevertheless, it can be shown that our results are qualitatively robust when confused consumers may end
up paying more than v = 1 but less than 1 + " for " < (k; k).
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Proof. Suppose rm i (j 6= i ) chooses a deterministic complexity level ki (kj).
(i) If ki = kj = k, all consumers are experts ((k; k) = 1), and rms compete à la Bertrand
and make zero prots. But then rm i could protably deviate to kdi = k
0 > k and a price
pi = 1 which would result in positive prots as there would be a non-trivial mass of confused
consumers (i.e., 1  (k0; k) > 0). Hence, it must be that in any candidate equilibrium at least
one rm (w.l.o.g. let it be i) chooses ki > k.
(ii) By (i) for any candidate equilibrium prole of price complexities (ki; kj), some consumers are
confused (i.e., 1 (ki; kj) > 0). But then for any such prole (ki; kj), there is a unique pricing
equilibrium where rms randomize according to a c.d.f. on [p0; 1], with p0 = (1  (ki; kj))=
[1 (1 )(1 (ki; kj))] > 0 (see, for instance, Baye et al., 1992), and rm i makes prot i =
p0[1 sj(1 (ki; kj))]. But, as it must be that ki > k, rm i could protably deviate to pdi = p0
and kdi = k which would result in prot 
d
i = p0[1  sj(1  (k; kj))] > p0[1  sj(1  (ki; kj))]
as (k; kj)) > (ki; kj). So, there can be no equilibrium where both rms choose pure price
complexity strategies.
Lemma 1 implies that in any candidate equilibrium at least one rm randomizes on complex-
ity levels. As a result, the rms face two di¤erent types of consumers, confused and experts.16
There is a conict between the incentive to extract all surplus from confused consumers, and
the incentive to reduce price and compete for informed consumers. This intuition underlies
the following result, whose proof is standard and therefore omitted (see Varian, 1980, and
Rosenthal, 1980).
Lemma 2 There is no equilibrium where both rms use pure pricing strategies.
Lemmas 1 and 2 show that in any duopoly equilibrium there must be dispersion in both
prices and complexity levels. Firm is strategy space is [0; 1] [k; k]. Denote by i  i(pi; ki)
rm is mixed strategy for i = 1; 2. i is a bivariate c.d.f. and can be written as i =
Fi(pi)Hi(ki j pi), where Fi(pi) is the marginal c.d.f. of rm is random price and Hi(ki j pi) is
the conditional c.d.f. of rm is complexity level.17 For Fi(p) and Hi(ki j pi) to be well-dened
c.d.f.s they should be increasing on their supports.
16We focus on a case where (k; k) = 1. However, Lemma 1 is robust for (k; k) < 1 so long as @=@ki < 0,
for i = 1; 2. In that case, even for ki = kj = k, rms face both experts and confused and so in the candidate
price equilibrium, 1 = p0[1  (1 )(1 (k; k))] = (1 (k; k)). But, rm 1 can protably deviate to pdi = 1
and kd1 = k as 
d
1 = (1  (k; k)) > (1  (k; k)). As at least one of the rms chooses ki > k, part (ii) in the
proof of Lemma 1 applies.
17 If the two random variables, pi and ki are independent, Hi(ki j pi) = Hi(ki).
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Suppose rm i 6= j chooses a price pi and complexity level ki. Firm is expected prot,
which depends on rm is choices and on the rivals mixed strategy j , can be written as






















The expected base of confused consumers is presented in the second square brackets in i(pi; ki; j).
The remaining consumers form the expected base of experts. But, expert consumers purchase
from rm i only when it o¤ers a lower price than its rival. The expected number of informed
consumers, conditional on rm i being the low price seller, is presented in the rst square
brackets. Firm i serves a share si of the expected base of confused. The rst derivative of
i(pi; ki; j) w.r.t. ki is presented below using Leibnizs Rule. The equality follows from the























[(1  Fj(pi))  si] .
Then, as @(ki; kj)=@ki < 0, to maximize its expected-prot rm i chooses
ki(pi) =
8>>>><>>>>:
k if 1  Fj(pi) > si , pi < bpi
k if 1  Fj(pi) < si , pi > bpi
k; 8k 2 [k; k] if pi = bpi
,
where the threshold price bpi is implicitly dened by Fj(bpi) = 1  si, whenever bpi belongs to the
support of Fj . Lemma 1 implies that at least one of the cut-o¤ prices bpi belongs to the support
of the rivals price distribution function, as at least one rm mixes on complexity levels. The
next result summarizes these ndings.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, a rms complexity choice depends only on its price. Firm i
chooses its price according to a c.d.f. Fi(pi) with support Ti  [0; 1]. If pi < bpi (pi > bpi) rm i
chooses the lowest complexity k (highest complexity k). If pi = bpi, rm i is indi¤erent between
any complexity level k 2 [k; k]. If the cut-o¤ price bpi 2 Tj (for i 6= j), then it is implicitly
dened by Fj(bpi) = sj. If bpi =2 Tj, rm i chooses a deterministic complexity level, but then it
must be that the rm j randomizes on prices (i.e. bpj 2 Ti).
When a rm mixes on complexity levels in equilibrium, there is a positive relationship
between prices and complexity. More specically, if bpi 2 Tj , at all prices below the cut-o¤
level bpi, rm i chooses the lowest complexity and at all prices above bpi, it chooses the highest
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complexity level. Intuitively, when a rm chooses a relatively high price, its incentive to choose
high complexity is stronger as it relies more on selling to confused consumers. In contrast,
when setting a relatively low price, a rm has a stronger incentive to choose low complexity as
this results in a larger base of experts.
Lemmas 3 - 6 in appendix A.1 explore the properties of the pricing c.d.f.s, and show that
both rms choose prices according to c.d.f.s which are dened on a common interval T = [p0; 1]
and are continuous everywhere except possibly at the upper bound p = 1.18 Using these
properties, we rst analyze a situation where both rms randomize on complexity levels, and
so the cut-o¤ prices dened in Proposition 1 must satisfy bpi 2 T = [p0; 1] (for i = 1; 2). This
implies that rm i = 1; 2 chooses complexity level k with probability Fi(bpi) and complexity level
k with probability 1 Fi(bpi). The threshold prices bpi 2 T are implicitly dened by sj = Fj(bpi)
where j = 1; 2, i 6= j, and sj is rm js share of consumers confused by complexity. Recall that
s1 =  > 1=2 and s2 = 1  . For expositional simplicity, denote:
1  F1(bp1) and 2  F2(bp2) :
Consistency requires that Fi(bpi) 2 (0; 1) and Fi(bpj) = si. The following condition holds when
both rms mix on both prices and complexity levels in equilibrium. If instead bp2 < bp1, then
the resulting values of 1 and 2 are inconsistent.19
Condition 1
0 < p0 < bp1 < bp2 < 1 .
Below we illustrate the derivation of rm 1s expected prot for p 2 [p0; bp1). By Proposition
1, rm 1 associates prices in this range with complexity level k. Then, its expected prot is
1(p; k) = pf(F2(bp2)  F2(p))(k; k) + (1  F2(bp2))(k; k) + (1)
[F2(bp2)(1  (k; k)) + (1  F2(bp2))(1  (k; k))]g .
With probability F2(bp2), rm 2 chooses k, so that there are (k; k) experts and 1   (k; k)
confused consumers. A share  of the confused purchases from rm 1, the prominent seller.
Informed consumers purchase from rm 1 if rm 2s price is higher, which happens with prob-
ability F2(bp2)   F2(p). With probability 1   F2(bp2), rm 2 chooses k and there are (k; k)
informed and 1 (k; k) confused consumers. All the informed purchase from rm 1 as it o¤ers
18This approach is related to Narasimhan (1988) and Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1992), for instance.
19More specically, 2 = F2(bp2) > 1   = F2(bp1).
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a lower price (rm 2 associates k with prices higher than bp2) and so does a share  of the
confused. The rst two terms in curly brackets capture the expected number of experts, while
the term in square brackets gives the expected number of confused consumers.
In appendix A.2, we present rm 1s expected prots at p0 and when p! bp1. In the same
appendix, we derive rm 1s expected prot for p 2 [bp1; bp2] and p 2 (bp2; 1], and rm 2s expected
prot over the three price ranges. Next section builds on these derivations to characterize the
mixed strategy equilibrium and to identify a condition on the parameter values under which
both rms randomize on both prices and complexity levels in equilibrium. When this condition
does not hold - which happens when rm 1s level of prominence is relatively high - both rms
mix on prices, but only the prominent rm randomizes on complexity levels.
4 Duopoly Equilibrium
In equilibrium, rm is expected prot for any price-complexity combination (p; ki), which is
assigned positive density in equilibrium, must be constant. Then, using expressions (A1) -
(A4), (A7) and (A8) in appendix A.2, we can write price ratios p0= bp1 and p0= bp2 as functions
of 2 = F2(bp2), rm 2s probability of choosing k in equilibrium, and 1 = F1(bp1), rm 1s
probability of choosing k in equilibrium. These ratios are presented in appendix A.3. We then
obtain the equilibrium values of 1 and 2,
1 =
(1  )[1  (2  )(1  (k; k))]
1  (1  2)(1  (k; k)) and 2 =
[1  (1  2)(1  (k; k))]
1  (2  )(1  (k; k)) . (2)
It can be checked that 1 2 (0; 1) and 2 > 0. Furthermore, 2 < 1 holds i¤ the following
condition is satised.
Condition 2
(1  ) =[  1   + 2] > 1  (k; k) .
Recall that (k; k) = 2(k; k)  1 and (k; k) < (k; k). As (k; k)  0, it follows that 1 
(k; k)  1=2. For relatively low levels of prominence (that is, for  2 (0:5; 0:71)), this condition
always holds and so rm 2 mixes between the highest and the lowest price complexity levels.
More generally, for a given (k; k), the condition is satised when rm 1s level of prominence
is not too high. However, Condition 2 gets more stringent as rm 1s prominence increases (the
LHS of the inequality in the condition is decreasing in ). When rm 1 is prominent enough,
rm 2 benets more from price transparency, as its share of confused consumers is relatively
small.
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In appendix A.3, we show that when i 2 (0; 1), the consistency requirements also hold
(that is, Fi(bp1) < Fi(bp2) for i = 1; 2; where Fi(bpi) = i and Fi(bpj) = si). Also there, we explore
the rmsprice c.d.f.s at the upper bound of the support. Using Lemma 4, we show that rm
2s price c.d.f. is continuous everywhere, while rm 1 has a mass point at the upper bound of
the price c.d.f.s support, p = 1. Then, we verify that p0, bp1, and bp2 are well dened under
Condition 2. Finally, we present the equilibrium cut-o¤ prices in expressions (A10) and (A11)
and the pricing c.d.f.s of the two rms. Using (A1), (A5), and (2), we obtain the equilibrium
prot of rm 1, 1 and the lower bound of the price support, p0.
1 = (1  (k; k))
2       2   2 + 3 (1  (k; k))
1  (2  )(1  (k; k)) and (3)
p0 = (1  (k; k))
2       2   2 + 3 (1  (k; k))
(k; k) + (1  )(2    + 1)(1  (k; k))2 . (4)
Then, using p0 and (A7), we calculate rm 2s equilibrium prot,
2 = (1  (k; k)))
2       2   2 + 3 (1  (k; k))
1  (1  2)(1  (k; k)) . (5)
Note that 1=2 = 2= = (1  )=1.
Below we summarize our ndings.
Proposition 2 Under Condition 2, in the unique mixed strategy equilibrium rm i chooses the
lowest complexity k with probability i = Fi(bpi) 2 (0; 1), dened in (2) and highest complexity
k with probability 1  i. Both rms randomize on prices in [p0; 1], with p0 given in (4). Firm
2s price c.d.f. (F2) is continuous on [p0; 1], while rm 1s price c.d.f. (F1) is continuous on
[p0; 1) and has an atom at p = 1. Firm i uses k (k) at prices below (above) bpi 2 (p0; 1). The
equilibrium prots 1 and 2 are given in (3) and (5).
When rm 1s prominence is not too high in the sense that  > 1=2, but Condition 2 is
satised, both rms randomize on complexity levels and prices in equilibrium. In this case,
the di¤erence in the rmsshares of confused consumers is not too large. In the limit, when
 ! 1=2, 1 = 2 = 1=2, bp1 = bp2, and both rmspricing c.d.f.s are continuous everywhere
on their common support. This is consistent with the results in Carlin (2009). The following
numerical example and Figure 1 illustrate the results in Proposition 2.
Example 1 When  = :6 and (k; k) = :6, in equilibrium rm 1 and 2 choose k with proba-
bility 1 = :357 and 2 = :672, respectively. The two rms randomize on prices according to
the following c.d.f.s, which are illustrated in Figure 1,
F1(p) =
8<:
:846  :284=p for p 2 [p0; bp2)
1:171  :474=p for p 2 [bp2; bp1]
2:131  1:422=p for p 2 (bp1; 1] and F2(p) =
8<:
:948  :319=p for p 2 [p0; bp2)
1:313  :531=p for p 2 [bp2; bp1]
2:593  1:593=p for p 2 (bp1; 1] ,
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where p0 = :336, bp1 = :582, and bp2 = :829. Firm 1 makes prot 1 = :319 and rm 2 makes
prot 2 = :284. Firm 1s atom at p = 1 is  = :108.






Figure 1: Firmsprice c.d.f.s for  = :6 and (k; k) = :6. F1(p) is the blue line and F2(p) is
the red line. The dashed lines correspond to prices associated with k:
When condition 2 does not hold, the results in Proposition 2 no longer apply as 2  1. In
this case, because rm 1s prominence advantage is large enough, rm 2 serves a relatively small
share of confused consumers. Then rm 2 relies more on expert consumers and so benets more
from market transparency than from confusion. We prove the following result in appendix A.4.
Proposition 3 When Condition 2 does not hold, in the unique mixed strategy equilibrium rm
2 chooses k for sure and rm 1 chooses the lowest complexity k with probability h1 = F
h
1 (bph1)
and the highest complexity k with probability 1  h1 , where
h1 =
(1  ) [1  (1  (k; k))]
1   (1  ) (1  (k; k)) .
Both rms randomize on prices in [ph0 ; 1], with p
h
0 = (1 (k; k)). Firm 2s price c.d.f. F h2 is
continuous on [ph0 ; 1], while rm 1s price c.d.f. F
h
1 is continuous on [p
h
0 ; 1) and has an atom at
p = 1. Firm 1 uses k (k) at prices below (above) bph1 = (1  (k; k)) 2 (ph0 ; 1). The equilibrium
prots are given by
h1 = (1  (k; k)) and h2 = (1  (k; k))
1  (1  (k; k))
1   (1  ) (1  (k; k)) . (6)
Thus, when prominence is large enough, rm 2 chooses the lowest complexity for sure to
minimize the number of confused buyers and reduce its disadvantage. The prominent rm,
as before, associates lower prices with the lowest complexity (at those prices it benets from
more transparency) and higher prices with highest complexity (at those prices it relies more
on confused consumers). More specically, rm 1 chooses complexity k for all prices p < bph1 2
(ph0 ; 1), and k for all prices p  bph1 . Proposition 1 then requires that rmspricing c.d.f.s satisfy
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F h2 (bph1) = 1    and F h1 (1)   (that is, bph2  1).20 The following example and Figure 2
illustrate the results for relatively high prominence.
Example 2 When  = :8 and (k; k) = :6, in equilibrium rm 1 chooses k with probability
h1 = :145, while rm 2 chooses k for sure. The two rms randomize on prices according to the
following c.d.f.s, which are illustrated in Figure 2,
F h1 (p) =

:726  :232=p for p 2 [ph0 ; bph1)
1:113  :387=p for p 2 [bph1 ; 1] and F h2 (p) =

1  :32=p for p 2 [ph0 ; bph1)
1:533  :533=p for p 2 [bph1 ; 1] ,
where ph0 = :32 and bph1 = :4. Firm 1 makes prot h1 = :32 and rm 2 makes prot h2 = :232.
Firm 1s atom at p = 1 is h = :274.






Figure 2: Firmsprice c.d.f.s for  = :8 and (k; k) = :6. F h1 (p) is the blue line and F
h
2 (p) is
the red line. The dashed lines correspond to prices associated with k.
Propositions 2 and 3 indicate that neither individual prots nor industry prot are globally
monotonic in the level of prominence. Examples 1 and 2 show that an increase in prominence
(from  = :6 to  = :8) might be benecial to the consumers as industry prots decrease
(from :603 to :552). When rm 1 is relatively more salient, the less prominent rm competes
more ercely, by choosing lower prices (in the rst order stochastic dominance sense) and by
increasing market transparency. The lower the complexity of the market, the larger the pool
of potential buyers for the less prominent rm. The examples suggest that markets where new
entrants compete with an incumbent rm which is prominent enough may be more competitive
than markets where the di¤erences in prominence between suppliers are relatively smaller. This
is consistent with the empirical ndings in Giulietti, Waterson, and Wildenbeest (2014). They
show that in the British electricity markets between 2002 and 2005 new entrants have lower
incentives to price aggressively as they become more prominent.
20 If Fh1 (1) >  then, as by Lemma 1 F
h
1 (bph2 ) = , bph2 < 1 and the candidate h2 = F2(bph2 ) < 1. But this is
inconsistent with an equilibrium where rm 2 chooses k for sure.
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However, when Condition 2 does not hold and so rm 1 is prominent enough, both rm 1s




h2) are strictly increasing in .
21 As total surplus
is constant, this implies that consumer surplus decreases in  in this case. When Condition 2
holds and rm 1s level of prominence is relatively low, rm 2s prot 2 is strictly decreasing in
 and consumer surplus in not monotonic in .22 Figure 3 illustrates individual and aggregate
prots as functions of the level of prominence in a numerical example where (k; k) = 0:6; in
this case, total industry prot is lowest and consumers surplus highest at  = 0:754 which is
the cut-o¤ prominence value for the two types of equilibria presented in Propositions 2 and 3.
Example 3 Suppose (k; k) = 0:6. Then, Condition 2 holds i¤  2 (0:5; 0:754).








Figure 3: Prot of rm 1 (black solid), rm 2 (dashed) and total prot (red) for (k; k) = :6
Firm 1s probability of choosing the lowest complexity (1) decreases in . Firm 2s prob-
ability of choosing the lowest complexity (2) weakly increases in : 2 strictly increases in
 when Condition 2 holds and it is constant otherwise. It can also be shown that the lower
bound of the rmsprice support is not monotonic in , while the cut-o¤ prices of rm 1 and
2, respectively, are weakly decreasing and increasing in .23 The likelihood that the prominent
rm chooses the monopoly price strictly increases in .
Combining the results in Propositions 2 and 3, we analyze next the role of prominence.
Corollary 1 In the mixed strategy equilibrium, (i) the more prominent rm makes higher
prots than the rival; (ii) the price distribution of the prominent rm rst order stochastically
dominates the one of the less prominent rm; (iii) the more prominent rms average price is




h2) total industry prots when Condition 2 does not hold. Then @

h=@ =
f2  (1  )[4     [2  (2  )(1  )]]g = [1  (1  )(1  )]2 > 0.
22Numerical simulations suggest that consumer surplus is U-shaped over the range of s where Condition 2
holds.
23 bp1 is strictly decreasing in , while bph1 = 1  (k; k) and so independent of . bp2 is strictly increasing in ,
while bph2 = 1 and so constant.
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higher than that of the less prominent rm, and (iv) the less prominent rm chooses the lowest
complexity (k) with higher probability than the rival.
The prominent rm attracts a larger share of confused consumers, and so it benets more
from market-wide confusion. For this reason, it chooses the highest level of complexity with
higher probability than its rival, has lower incentives to compete for the expert consumers, and
therefore it chooses a higher average price. The combined e¤ect of charging higher prices (in the
rst order stochastic dominance sense) and attracting a higher share of the confused consumers
allows the prominent rm to make higher prots in equilibrium. Confused consumersbias in
favor of the prominent rm appears to be inconsistent with the ranking of the average prices.
However, our next result shows that their behavior is consistent with the ranking of the average
prices, conditional on these being associated with the lowest complexity (k).
Corollary 2 Consumer Confusion. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, the more prominent
rm chooses a lower cut-o¤ price - below which it uses the lowest level of price complexity k -
than its rival (bp1 < bp2 when Condition 2 holds and bph1 < bph2 when it does not). Furthermore,
conditional on choosing the lowest complexity, the more prominent rm o¤ers a lower average
price than its rival (E(p1 j p1 < bp1) < E(p2 j p2 < bp2) when Condition 2 holds, and E(p1 j
p1 < bph1) < E(p2 j p2 < bph2) when it does not).
We prove this corollary in appendix A.5 and sketch here the intuition. Conditional on
pricing strictly below the monopoly level (p = 1), the price c.d.f.s of the two rms are identical.
This can be seen in Examples 1 and 2. Combined with the fact that, in equilibrium, the cut-o¤
price below which rm 1 chooses k is lower than the corresponding cut-o¤ of rm 2 (that is,
bp1 < bp2, if Condition 2 holds, and bph1 < bph2 , if it does not), this proves the corollary.
One interpretation of our model is that understanding a price associated with the high
complexity level k is costly for the consumers (e.g., requires time or e¤ort). Consumers may
opt out of this costly evaluation process, in which case they end up confused and randomize
their choice. In contrast, understanding a price associated with the low complexity level k is
costless. As the cost of evaluating two prices associated with k is higher than that of evaluating
one, more consumers are confused when both rms use k than when only one does (which is
consistent with 1   (k; k) > 1   (k; k)).24 Consider a consumer who looks for the lowest
expected price available in the market and can assess prices associated with k, but not those
associated with k. Then, conditional on k, the prominent rms expected price is lower than
that of the rival and so the consumer is more likely to choose its product.25 If the confused
24See also Chioveanu and Zhou (2013) for a related discussion.
25Consumers may gather information on prices through recommendations on online forums or social networks.
Transparent-price o¤ers may be more likely to be recommended as more people understand them and they are
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consumers are myopicin this sense and only take into account the average price conditional
on it being associated with the lowest price complexity level, the prominent rm enjoys a
larger share of confused consumers. Such behavior could be further related to a stochastic
utility model in which confused consumers approximatethe surplus from rm is product to
v E(pi j pi < bpi)+"i, where "i is a random variable that captures confusion due to complexity.
For a thorough discussion of this class of models, see Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse (1992).
5 Extensions
5.1 Biased Experts
This part explores the robustness of our results in a modied model where experts choices
are also a¤ected by rm prominence. More specically, although expert consumers are able to
assess prices correctly, they are biased in favor of the prominent rm and purchase its product
so long as p1 < p2 + d, where pi is rm is price, for i = 1; 2, d 2 (0; 1) is a prominence
premium, and p1 < 1. Like before, consumersvaluation for the product is not a¤ected by
prominence (i.e., they face a budget constraint). But, so long as the price does not exceed their
valuation (v = 1), the experts are ready to pay a premium for the prominent brand.26 This
set-up could also be interpreted as one where consumers have a default-bias and, although they
can correctly compare prices, the experts have switching cost d.




j (kj j pj),





pj) is the conditional c.d.f. of rm js complexity level, then it is a best response for rm i to
randomize on price complexity levels. We provide there further discussion using a numerical
example which illustrates that, for some values of d, there is an equilibrium where (i) rms
randomize on both prices and complexity levels, (ii) prices below (above) a cut-o¤ level are
associated with the lowest (highest) complexity, and (iii) the average price of the prominent
rm conditional on using the lowest complexity is lower than that of the rival. So, in line with
our main analysis, there is a positive relationship between prices and price complexity levels
and consumersbias in favour of the prominent rm is consistent with the ranking of average
prices that rms o¤er with the lowest complexity.
associated with relatively low prices. Based on this, the o¤ers of the prominent rm may appear to be better.
26However, like in our benchmark analysis, empirical evidence suggests that prominence is more likely to
a¤ect confused consumers rather than the experts. In a study of physically homogeneous products (including
health products and retail food and drinks), Bronnenberg, Dubé, Gentzkow, and Shapiro (2015) nd that expert
consumers are considerably less likely than average consumers to pay a premium for branded products.
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5.2 Alternative Confusion Technologies
The main analysis assumes that a marginal increase in rm is complexity reduces the fraction
of experts in the market but does not alter the e¤ectiveness of the rivals marginal increase
in price complexity on consumers, that is, @2=@k1@k2 = 0. Below we prove that there exists
an equilibrium which is qualitatively consistent with the one in the main analysis whenever
@2=@k1@k2 > 0. As @=@ki = i < 0, this condition requires that the magnitude of the
marginal impact of rm is complexity be decreasing in rm js complexity (@ jij =@kj < 0).27
More specically, we show that if the rival uses a mixed strategy with a positive relationship
between price and price complexity, it is a best response for a rm to associate prices below a
threshold with the lowest complexity and prices above it with the highest complexity.
Suppose rm j uses a mixed strategy j so that dkj(pj)=dpj  0. Consider the expected
prots of rm i presented in section 3:





























= 0 , (7)
where @(ki; kj(pj))=@ki  i(ki; kj(pj)) gives the marginal impact of ki on  and E(i(pj) j
pj > pi) =
R k
k i(ki; kj(pj))dHj(kj j pj > pi) is the expected marginal impact of an increase in
ki on the fraction of experts conditional on rm js price being higher than pi. For given j ,R 1
p0
E(i(pj))dFj(pj) - the overall expected marginal impact of an increase in ki on the fraction of




and when pi ! 1, it converges to  si
Z 1
p0









d (E(i(pj) j pj > pi))
dpi

dFj(pj)  ei (pi)F 0j(pi) > 0 ,
where the equality follows from Leibnizs Rule. As  ei (pi) > 0 and F 0j(pi) > 0, this condition
27An example of confusion technology which satises this assumption is (k1; k2) = (k)2=(k1k2):
19
holds if dE(i(pj) j pj > pi)=dpi > 0. But, as dkj(pj)=dpj > 0; a su¢ cient condition is then
@i(ki; kj)=@kj = @
2(ki; kj)=@ki@kj > 0. Hence, whenever @2=@ki@kj > 0 there exists a
unique bpi 2 (p0; 1) which satises (7) and it follows that rm is complexity level choice is
ki(p) =
8>>>><>>>>:
k if p < bpi
k if p > bpi
k; 8k 2 [k; k] if p = bpi ,
whenever bpi belongs to Tj the support of Fj . Lemma 1 implies that at least one of the cut-o¤
prices bpi belongs to Tj . This shows that a mixed strategy equilibrium like the one analyzed in
our benchmark model exists for a more general confusion technology.
6 Conclusions
We analyze the interplay between consumer confusion due to price complexity and rm promi-
nence in a model where two rms compete by simultaneously choosing prices and the complexity
of their price o¤ers. One of the rms enjoys a higher level of prominence, which may be due to
higher brand recognition, industry dynamics, or advertising e¤ort/spending. Price complex-
ity limits the comparability of rmsprice o¤ers and so, in its presence, some consumers are
informed of all prices and able to identify the best o¤er, while the others may get confused
and are unable to assess rmso¤ers. Firmsprice complexity choices determine the share of
confused consumers. These consumers shop at random and favour the more prominent rm,
in the sense that they are more likely to buy from it.
In equilibrium there is dispersion in both prices and complexity levels. The nature of the
equilibrium depends on the level of prominence. For moderate levels of prominence, both rms
mix on price complexity levels, while for high levels of prominence, the less prominent rm
chooses the lowest price complexity. The prominent rm makes higher prots, chooses higher
prices on average and the lowest complexity level with lower probability, and sets the monopoly
price with positive probability. However, a decrease in prominence may increase industry prots
and harm consumers. In addition, conditional on choosing the lowest complexity, the prominent
rm sets a lower price, on average, which is consistent with confused consumersbehavior. The
perceptions of these consumers may be biased because they ignore complex prices and consider
only the most transparent ones.
We show that our results are robust in a setting where the expert consumers are also biased
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towards the prominent rm and so willing to pay a premium. We also nd that a qualitatively
similar equilibrium exists with alternative confusion technologies if the marginal impact of an
increase in one rms price complexity increases in the rivals complexity level. Our framework
may be used to endogeneize rm prominence, analyze oligopoly market outcomes, or explore
the role of complexity in markets where price format di¤erentiation, rather than complexity, is
a source of confusion.
A Appendix
A.1 Properties of the Pricing Distribution Functions
Lemma 3 The supports of the pricing c.d.f.s, T1 and T2 are both connected intervals (i.e.,
there are no gaps in either of them).
Proof. Let eT1 and eT2 be the convex hulls of T1 and T2, respectively. Let eT = eT1 \ eT2. (i)
Suppose there is a gapG  eT . (a) SupposeG  Ti for i = 1; 2. Let A = fp 2 T1[T2 j p  inf Gg
and pa = maxA and p0 = supG. Clearly, pa 2 Ti for at least one i and Fj(pa) = Fj(p0). But
then i(p0; k; j) > i(pa; k; j). A contradiction. (b) Suppose G  Ti but G \ Tj = ?. Let
p00 = inf G. Clearly, j(p0; k; i) > j(p00; k; i). A contradiction. (ii) Suppose there is a gap
Z  eTi eT . Let B = fp 2 Ti j p  inf Zg and pb = maxB. Let C = fp 2 Ti j p  supZg and
pc = minC. Clearly, i(pc; k; j) > i(pb; k; j). A contradiction.
Lemma 4 Neither rm can have a mass point in the interior or at the lower bound of the
other ones price c.d.f. support. Moreover, rm i cannot have a mass point at the upper bound
of Tj if rm j has a mass point there.
Proof. Suppose rm j has a mass point at some p0 2 Tj with p0 < maxTj . It must be that
p0 2 Ti, otherwise rm j would have incentives to move the mass point to a higher price. Then,
rm i is better o¤ deviating to p0    as there is a discrete increase in market share and only
a marginal decrease in price. Recall that (k1; k2) > 0, that is, there are always some price
aware consumers. The above argument applies also at p0 = maxTj , so that both rms cannot
have a mass point at the upper bound of js support.
Lemma 5 In equilibrium, it must hold that T1 = T2 = [p0; ph] for p0 < ph  1.
Proof. Suppose 9p0 2 Ti such that p0 =2 Tj . Let A = fp 2 Tj j p > p0g. Suppose A 6= ?
and let p00 = minA. Then, i(p00; ki; j) > i(p0; ki; j) as rm i does not lose any market share
when deviating from p0 to p00. If A = ?, then it must be that p0 > maxTj . If p0 < 1, then
a similar argument to the one above applies and i(1; ki; j) > i(p
0; ki; j). If p0 = 1, then
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Lemma 4 implies that at least one of the rms does not have a mass point at maxTj : Then,
that rm can protably deviate to p0 = 1 from p = maxTj .
Lemma 6 In equilibrium, supT1 = supT2 = 1.
Proof. Suppose supTi < 1. By Lemma 5, supTj = supTi = ph. By Lemma 4, both rms
cannot have mass points at ph. But, then, at least one rm sells only to its share of confused
consumers at ph and it is clearly better o¤ charging a higher price p = 1. A contradiction.
A.2 Expected Prots
Derivation of Firm 1s Expected Prot
 Suppose rm 1 chooses a price p 2 [p0; bp1).
Using expression (1), together with (k; k) = 1 and F2(bp2) = 2, we obtain rm 1s expected
prot at p = p0 and when p! bp1,
1(p0; k) = p0





p%bp1 1(p; k) = bp1    (1  )(1  2)(1  (k; k)) . (A2)
 Suppose rm 1 chooses a price p 2 [bp1; bp2].
By Proposition 1, it associates prices in this range with complexity level k. Then, its
expected prot is
1(p; k) = pf(F2(bp2)  F2(p))(k; k) + (1  F2(bp2))(k; k) + (A3)
[F2(bp2)(1  (k; k)) + (1  F2(bp2))(1  (k; k))]g .
The expected number of confused consumers is the term in square brackets. Firm 1 serves a
fraction  of this group. Firm 1 also serves the expert consumers if rm 2 chooses a higher
price. With probability F2(bp2)   F2(p), there are (k; k) experts while, with probability 1  
F2(bp2), there are (k; k); this is reected by the rst two terms in curly brackets. Recall that
@2=@k1@k2 = 0, so 1   (k; k) = (k; k)   (k; k) and, using F2(bp2) = 2, it follows that
1(p; k) = limp%bp1 1(p; k), as given in (A2). Also, as by Proposition 1, F2(bp1) = 1   , the
expected prot at p = bp2 becomes
1(bp2; k) = bp2f(1  2)  (1  (k; k))[2(1     2) + 2]g . (A4)
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 Suppose rm 1 chooses a price p 2 (bp2; 1].
By Proposition 1, it associates prices in this range with complexity level k. Then, its
expected prot is
1(p; k) = pf(1  F2(p))(k; k) + [F2(bp2)(1  (k; k)) + (1  F2(bp2))(1  (k; k))]g .
Echoing previous reasoning, with probability F2(bp2), rm 2 chooses k, in which case there are
(k; k) informed and 1   (k; k) confused consumers. A share  of the confused purchases
from rm 1, the prominent seller. The experts do not purchase from rm 1 as rm 2s price
is lower. With probability 1   F2(bp2), rm 2 chooses k, so there are (k; k) informed and
1 (k; k) confused consumers. A share  of confused consumers buy from rm 1. The experts
purchase from rm 1 if it o¤ers a lower price, which happens with probability 1  F2(p). The
rst term in curly brackets captures the expected number of experts, while the term in square
brackets gives the expected number of confused consumers. As 1  (k; k) = (k; k)  (k; k)
and F2(bp2) = 2, rm 1s expected prot becomes
1(p; k) = pf1  2   (1  (k; k))[2(1     2) + 2]g . (A5)
It can be checked that limp&bp2 1(p; k) = 1(bp2; k) as presented in (A4).
Derivation of Firm 2s Expected Prot
 Suppose rm 2 chooses a price p 2 [p0; bp1).
By Proposition 1, it associates prices in this range with complexity level k. Then, its
expected prot is
2(p; k) = pf(F1(bp1)  F1(p))(k; k) + (1  F1(bp1))(k; k) +
(1  )[F1(bp1)(1  (k; k)) + (1  F1(bp1))(1  (k; k))]g . (A6)
With probability F1(bp1), rm 1 chooses k, so that there are (k; k) informed and 1   (k; k)
confused consumers. A share 1    (< ) of the confused purchases from rm 2, the less
prominent seller. The experts purchase from rm 2 if rm 1s price is higher, which happens
with probability F1(bp1)   F1(p). With probability 1   F1(bp1), rm 1 chooses k, so there are
(k; k) informed and 1   (k; k) confused consumers. All experts purchase from rm 2 as it
o¤ers a lower price (rm 1 associates k with prices higher than bp1) and so does a share 1  
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of the confused consumers. The rst two terms in the curly brackets capture the expected
number of experts, whereas the term in square brackets gives the expected number of confused
consumers. Using (k; k) = 1 and F1(bp1) = 1, it follows that,
2(p0; k) = p0[1  (1  1)(1  (k; k))] and lim
p%bp1 2(p; k) = bp1(1  1)[1  (1  (k; k))] .
(A7)
 Suppose rm 2 chooses a price p 2 [bp1; bp2].
By Proposition 1, it associates prices in this range with complexity level k. Then, rm 2s
expected prot becomes
2(p; k) = pf(1  F1(p))(k; k) + (1  )[F1(bp1)(1  (k; k)) + (1  F1(bp1))(1  (k; k))]g
= p

(1  F1(p))(k; k) + (1  )(1  1)(1  (k; k))

.
The logic behind the expression above is similar to the one for (A6), with the di¤erence that
when rm 1 uses k there are (k; k) = 1 informed consumers and when it uses k there are
(k; k). Clearly, when rm 1 uses k, it attracts all the experts, as it o¤ers a lower price. It is
easy to check that 2(bp1; k) = limp%bp1 2(p; k) as given by (A7), and that the expected prot
at bp2 is
2(bp2; k) = bp2(1  ) 1  1(1  (k; k)) . (A8)
 Suppose rm 2 chooses a price p 2 (bp2; 1].
By Proposition 1, it associates prices in this range with complexity level k. Then, its
expected prot becomes
2(p; k) = pf(1  F1(p))(k; k) + (1  )[F1(bp1)(1  (k; k)) + (1  F1(bp1))(1  (k; k))]g
= pf(1  F1(p))(2(k; k)  1) + (1  )(2  1)(1  (k; k))g . (A9)
A.3 Equilibrium Analysis
Price Ratios Using the FirmsConstant Prot Conditions
In equilibrium, each rm is expected prot for any price-complexity combination (p; ki),
which is assigned positive density in equilibrium, must be constant.
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Using (A1) - (A4), the constant prot conditions for rm 1 lead to the following price ratios
expressed as functions of 2:
p0bp1 =    (1  )(1  2)(1  (k; k))1  (1  )(1  2)(1  (k; k)) and p0bp2 = 1  2   [2(1  )(1  2)  2](1  (k; k))1  (1  )(1  2)(1  (k; k)) .
Using (A7) and (A8), the constant prot conditions of rm 2 lead to the following price
ratios expressed as functions of 1
p0bp1 = (1  1)[1  (1  (k; k))]1  (1  1)(1  (k; k)) and p0bp2 = (1  )

1  1(1  (k; k))

1  (1  1)(1  (k; k))
.
Equilibrium  Values
In this part, we show that equilibrium 1 is always well dened and that 2 is well dened
when Condition 2 holds. The expression for the s is given in (2).
(i) First, it is easy to see that 1 <  and 2 > 1   as 1 > (1  )(1  (k; k)).
(ii) We now check that i 2 (0; 1).
 As (k; k)+2(1 (k; k)) > 0, 1 > 0, 1 (2 )(1 (k; k)) > 0, 1=(1 (k; k)) >
(2  ). This always holds as the RHS is lower than 1 and the LHS larger than 1.
 1 < 1 , (1   )[1   (2   )(1   (k; k))] < (k; k) + 2(1   (k; k)) , =(1  
)
 
1   + 2 > (1  (k; k)), which always holds as the LHS is always larger than 1.
 2 > 0, by the same argument used to show that 1 > 0.
 2 < 1, (1  ) =[
 
1   + 2] > (1  (k; k)) which gives Condition 2.
Mass Point at Upper Bound
If both rmsprice c.d.f.s were continuous everywhere (that is, if F1(1) = F2(1) = 1), then
using (A5) and (A9), it would follow that 1 = (2   2)(1   (k; k)) and 2 = (1   )(2  
1)(1  (k; k)). Then, the lower bounds of the supports would be
p10 =
(2  2)(1  (k; k))
1  (1  )(1  2)(1  (k; k))
> p20 =
(1  )(2  1)(1  (k; k))
1  (1  1)(1  (k; k))
.
The inequality uses the fact that 1=(1 ) = 2=.28 But, this contradicts Lemma 5. Suppose
now that rm 2 had a mass point, so that F2(1) < 1. By Lemma 4, it must be that F1(1) = 1
28 It can then be reduced to 1  (k; k) < (2   2)= [2   2 + (1  )(   2)]. But as 2 >  for   1=2
the RHS is larger than 1, while the LHS is smaller than 1.
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and rm 2s prot is 2 = (1   )(2   1)(1   (k; k)). But then if rm 2 deviates to p10, it
makes prots [1  (1  1)(1  (k; k))]p10 > (1  )(2  1)(1  (k; k)). A contradiction.
So, it must be that rm 2s price c.d.f. is continuous everywhere, while rm 1 has a mass
point at p = 1. Then, at p = 1, rm 1s expected prot is
1(1; k) = [1  2(k; k))  (1  2)(k; k)] = (2  2)(1  (k; k)) .
Equilibrium Prots and Boundary Prices
First we present the boundary price p0 and the cut-o¤ prices bp1 and bp2 as functions of 2
and check that they are consistent with Condition 1.
p0 =
(2  2)(1  (k; k))
1  (1  )(1  2)(1  (k; k))
and bp1 = (2  2)(1  (k; k))
   (1  )(1  2)(1  (k; k))
,
bp2 = (2  2)(1  (k; k))
1  2   [2(1     2) + 2](1  (k; k))
=
(2  2)(1  (k; k))
(1  2)[1  (2  )(1  (k; k))] + (1  (k; k))
.
We focus on a situation where both rms randomize on prices and complexity, so 2 2 (0; 1).
Also, by Proposition 1, F2(bp1) = 1   . As bp1 < bp2, it must be that that F2(bp1) = 1    <
2 = F2(bp2) (see Lemmas 3 and 4).
 bp1 > p0 , 1   > 0, so it clearly holds.
 bp2 > p0 ,  2   (1  2)(1  )(1  (k; k)) < 0 which holds for 2 2 (0; 1).
 bp1 < 1,  2(k; k)) < (2   1)(1  2)(1  (k; k)) which holds for 2 2 (0; 1).
 bp2 < 1,  2(k; k)  1 (2   1) < 0:
 bp2 > bp1 ,  (1 )(1 2)(1 (k; k)) > (1 2) (1 (k; k))[2(1  2)+2],
1     2 < 0.
Below we check that the equilibrium prots are well dened and present the equilibrium
values of the cut-o¤ prices.
I 1 given in (3) is well dened. It is easy to see that 1   (2   )(1   (k; k)) > 0.
Also, under Condition 2,

2       3  2 + 2 (1  (k; k)) > 0. It follows that 1 > 0.
Furthermore, as
2       3  2 + 2 (1  (k; k))
1  (2  )(1  (k; k)) <
1
(1  (k; k)) ,
[1  (2  )(1  (k; k))]2 + (2   1)2(1  (k; k))2 > 0 ,
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it follows that 1 < 1.
I 2 given in (5) is well dened. Under Condition 2, as  > 1=2, it follows that 2     

 
2   2 + 3 (1  (k; k)) > 0. It is then straightforward that 2 > 0. Noting that 2 < 1
as 1  (1  2)(1  (k; k)) > 1  (2  )(1  (k; k)),  > 1=2, it follows that 2 < 1.
I The expressions for bp1 and bp2 are presented below.
bp1 = (1  (k; k))[2     (3  2 + 2)(1  (k; k))]
 + (3   32 + 2   1)(1  (k; k)) + (1  )(1   + 2)(1  (k; k))2 ,(A10)
bp2 = (1  (k; k))[2       2   2 + 3 (1  (k; k))]
(1  )[1  (1  )(2 + )(1  (k; k)) + (1  )(2  )(1  (k; k))2] . (A11)
Equilibrium Pricing
Firm 2s c.d.f. is implicitly dened by the constant prot conditions of rm 1. These
conditions can be written using the expected prots, which are presented in appendix A.2, and




FL2 (p) for p 2 [p0; bp2)
FM2 (p) for p 2 [bp2; bp1]
FH2 (p) for p 2 (bp1; 1]
.
Below we identify piece-wise the c.d.f., using the equilibrium 2; as presented in (2).
For prices in [p0; bp1), the constant prot condition of rm 1 requires
p

1  F2(p)  (1  )(1  2)(1  (k; k))

= 1 .
After re-arranging the terms, we obtain
1  FL2 (p) = (1  (k; k))
(1  )[1       1   + 2 (1  (k; k))]




For prices in the middle range [bp1; bp2], the constant prot condition is
pf(k; k)(2   F2(p)) + (k; k)(1  2) + [2(1  (k; k)) + (1  2)(1  (k; k))]g = 1 .
After re-arranging the terms, we obtain
1  FM2 (p) =  
(1  (k; k))
(k; k)








1  (1  )2     (3  2 + 
2)(1  (k; k))







For prices in the high range (bp2; 1], the constant prot condition is,
p





1  FH2 (p) =  
(1  (k; k))
(2(k; k)  1)(2  2) +
1
p(2(k; k)  1)
=   (1  (k;
k))
(2(k; k)  1)
[2     (3  2 + 2)(1  (k; k))]
1  (2  )(1  (k; k)) +
1
p(2(k; k)  1) .
It is straightforward to check that F2(p) is continuous on [p0; 1] and strictly increasing.
To pin down rm 1s c.d.f. we use the constant prot conditions for rm 2, the expected
prots presented earlier in this appendix, and the equilibrium prot 2 dened in (5). As
before, there are three di¤erent price ranges to be considered, so that
F1(p) =
8>>>><>>>>:
FL1 (p) for p 2 [p0; bp2)
FM1 (p) for p 2 [bp2; bp1]
FH1 (p) for p 2 (bp1; 1]
.
We proceed to identify piece-wise the c.d.f., substituting the equilibrium 1; as presented
in (2).
For prices in [p0; bp1), the constant prot condition of rm 2 requires
p[1  F1(p)  (1  1)(1  (k; k))] = 2 .
By re-arranging the terms, we get
1  FL1 (p) = (1  (k; k))
[   (1  )(2    + 1)(1  (k; k))]




For prices in the middle range [bp1; bp2], the constant prot condition is
p





1  FM1 (p) =  
(1  (k; k))
(k; k)
(1  )[   (1  )(2    + 1)(1  (k; k))]





For prices in the high range (bp2; 1], the constant prot condition is,
pf(2(k; k)  1)(1  F1(p)) + (1  )(1  (k; k))(2  1)g = 2 .
After re-arranging the terms, we obtain
1  FH1 (p) =  
(1  (k; k))
2(k; k)  1
(1  )[1 +    (1  )(2 + 2)(1  (k; k))]
1  (1  2)(1  (k; k)) +
2
p(2(k; k)  1) .
It is straightforward to check that F1(p) is continuous on [p0; 1) and strictly increasing.
Furthermore, rm 1 has a mass point at p = 1,
  1  FH1 (1) =
(2   1) (1  (k; k))
1  (1  2)(1  (k; k)) 2 (0; 1) for  > 1=2 .
A.4 Equilibrium Analysis for High Prominence
In this subsection we focus on a situation where Condition 2 does not hold.
Proof of Proposition 3. When rm 1 chooses a price p 2 [ph0 ; bph1), it uses complexity level
k. Then, rm 1s expected prot in this range is h1(p; k) = p
 




0 ; k) =
ph0 and limp%bph1 h1(p; k) = bph1 . When rm 1 chooses a price p 2 [bph1 ; 1), it uses complexity




(1  F h2 (p))(k; k) + (1  (k; k))
i
,
and it follows that 1(bph1 ; k) = bph1 . Note that the constant prot condition of rm 1 implies
that ph0 = bph1 .
When rm 2 chooses a price p 2 [ph0 ; bph1), it uses complexity level k. Then, as (k; k) = 1 and
F h1 (bph1) = h1 , rm 2s expected prot becomes
h2(p; k) = p
h
h1   F h1 (p) + (1  h1)(k; k) + (1  )(1  h1)(1  (k; k))
i
.
It then follows that,
h2(p
h









2(p; k) = bph1(1 h1) 1  (1  (k; k)) .
Combining ph0 = bph1 with the constant prot condition of rm 2, we obtain the value for h1
in the proposition.
When rm 2 chooses a price p 2 [bph1 ; 1), it still uses complexity level k. Then, rm 2s expected
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prot becomes
h2(p; k) = p
h
(1  F h1 (p))(k; k) + (1  )(1  h1)(1  (k; k))
i
.
By Lemma 4, both rms cannot have a mass point at p = 1. It can be checked that F h1 (1) = 1




h1 = (1  )(1  (k; k))=
[1   (1   (k; k))] and F h2 (1) < 0, which is not possible. Hence, it must be that rm 1 has
an atom at p = 1 and rm 2s c.d.f. is continuous on [ph0 ; 1]. Then, F
h
2 (1) = 1 implies that, in
equilibrium, bph1 = (1  (k; k)) and rmsprots and ph0 follow.
The mass point in rm 1s price c.d.f. is
h  1  F h1 (1) =
2(1  (k; k))
1   (1  ) (1  (k; k)) < 1 ,
and consistency requires that F h1 (1)  , which is the case whenever
(1  )=(1   + 2)  (1  (k; k)) .
But this is exactly the reverse of Condition 2.
Equilibrium Pricing
To identify rm 2s c.d.f. we use the constant prot conditions for rm 1. More specically,
we use the expected prots presented in section 4, and the equilibrium prot h1 dened in
(6). There are two price ranges to be considered, so that
F h2 (p) =
8<: F hL2 (p) for p 2 [p0; bph1)F hH2 (p) for p 2 [bph1 ; 1] .
Suppose rm 1 chooses a price p 2 [ph0 ; bph1), then




Suppose rm 1 chooses a price p 2 [bph1 ; 1], then









It is straightforward to check that F hL2 (bph1) = F hH2 (bph1) = 1   as bph1 = 1  (k; k).
To pin down rm 1s c.d.f. we use the constant prot conditions for rm 2. There are two
30
price ranges to be considered, so that
F h1 (p) =
8<: F hL1 (p) for p 2 [p0; bph1)F hH1 (p) for p 2 [bph1 ; 1] .
Suppose rm 2 chooses a price p 2 [ph0 ; bph1), then
1  F hL1 (p) =
(1  (k; k))
1   (1  ) (1  (k; k))






Suppose now that rm 2 chooses a price p 2 [bph1 ; 1], then
1  F hH1 (p) =
(1  (k; k))
(k; k)[1   (1  ) (1  (k; k))]






It is straightforward to check that F hL1 (bph1) = F hH1 (bph1) = h1 .
Firm 1s atom at p = 1 is given by
h  1  F hH1 (1) =
2(1  (k; k))
1   (1  ) (1  (k; k)) .
A.5 The Role of Prominence
Proof of Corollary 1. (i) Suppose that Condition 2 holds and consider the equilibrium in
Proposition 2. From (3) and (5), 1 > 2 , (2  1)(1 (k; k)) > 0 which holds for  > 1=2.
Suppose now that Condition 2 does not hold and consider the equilibrium in Proposition 3.
Using (6), it is easy to see that h1 > 

h2.
(ii) Suppose that Condition 2 holds. Let us inspect the equilibrium price c.d.f.s in appendix
A.2. (a) Consider rst prices p 2 [p0; bp1), dFL1 (p)=dp = 2=p2 < dFL2 (p)=dp = 1=p2 from point
(i) above. As FL1 (p0) = F
L
2 (p0) = 0, it follows that F
L
1 (p) < F
L
2 (p) in this range. Note also
that limp%bp1 FL1 (p) < limp%bp1 FL2 (p); (b) Consider now [bp1; bp2]. First note that dFM1 (p)=dp =
2=(k; k)p2 < dFM2 (p)=dp = 1=(k; k)p2. Moreover, point (a) and continuity of Fi on [p0; 1)
imply that FM1 (bp1) < FM2 (bp1). So, FM1 (p) < FM2 (p) in this range. (c) Consider [bp2; 1]. From
part (b) it follows that FM1 (bp2) < FM2 (bp2). By continuity, limp&bp2 FH1 (p) < limp&bp2 FH2 (p).
Noting that dFH1 (p)=dp = 

2=(2(k;
k)   1)p2 < dFH2 (p)=dp = 1=(2(k; k)   1)p2, it follows
that FH1 (p) < F
H
2 (p). Combining (a)-(c), F1(p) < F2(p) on [p0; 1], and so the price of the
prominent rm rst order stochastically dominates that of the less prominent rm. Suppose
that Condition 2 does not hold. Let us inspect the equilibrium price c.d.f.s in appendix A.4.
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Consider rst prices p 2 [p0; bph1),  dF hL1 (p)=dp =  dF hL2 (p)=dp = [1   (1   (k; k))]= [1  
 (1  ) (1   (k; k))] < 1. As F hL1 (ph0) = F hL2 (ph0) = 0, it follows that F hL1 (p) < F hL2 (p) in
this range. Consider now prices in [bph1 ; 1],  dF hH1 (p)=dp =  dF hH2 (p)=dp = [1 (1 (k; k))]=
[1   (1  ) (1  (k; k))] < 1. As F h1 and F h2 are continuous at bph1 , it follows that F hH1 (p) <
F hH2 (p) in this range, too. So, F
h
1 (p) < F
h
2 (p) on [p
h
0 ; 1], and so the price of the prominent rm
rst order stochastically dominates that of the less prominent rm.






Fi(pi))dpi + p0 when Condition 2 holds and E(pi) =
R 1
ph0
(1   F hi (pi))dpi + ph0 when Condition
2 does not hold.
(iv) Recall that when Condition 2 holds 1 = (1  )=2, so 1 < 2 ,  > (1  )(1   +
2)(1   (k; k)) which holds for  > 1=2. When Condition 2 does not hold, it is easy to see
from Proposition (3) that h1 < 1.
Proof of Corollary 2. First let us compare the cut-o¤ prices. Suppose Condition 2
holds. Using (A10) and (A11) in appendix A.2, we can check that bp1 < bp2 as
bp1bp2 = (1  )  (1  )
2(2 + )(1  (k; k)) + (1  )2(2  )(1  (k; k))2
 + (3   32 + 2   1)(1  (k; k)) + (1  )(1   + 2)(1  (k; k))2 .
Then, bp1 < bp2 ,
  (k;
k)(2   1)[1  (1  )(1  (k; k))]
 + (3   32 + 2   1)(1  (k; k)) + (1  )(1   + 2)(1  (k; k))2 < 0 .
The last inequality follows from the fact that, for  2 (:5; 1), all the terms in the numerator
are positive, while the denominator is positive (the last term is clearly positive, while the sum
of the rst two is also positive as (1  (k; k))  1=2).
If Condition 2 does not hold, rm 2 uses k for all prices on [ph0 ; 1] and bph1 = 1  (k; k) < 1.
Next we compare the rmsaverage prices conditional on using the lowest complexity level.
Suppose Condition 2 holds. F2 is continuous on [p0; 1] so that F2(p) = F2(p j p < 1), whereas
F1 is continuous on [p0; 1), but has an atom at p = 1,  = (2   1) (1   (k; k))= [1   (1  
2)(1  (k; k))]. Using the price c.d.f.s in appendix A.2, we can show that
F1(p j p < 1) = F1(p)
F1(1)
= F1(p)
1  (1  2)(1  (k; k))
1  (2  )(1  (k; k)) = F2(p) .
Let G(p) = F1(p j p < 1). Note that F1(p j p < bp1) = G(p j p < bp1). This is because
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F1(p j p < bp1) = F1(p)= F1(bp1) and G(p j p < bp1) = F1(p)= F1(1)G(bp1). But then,
G(p j p < bp1) = F2(p j p < bp1) > F2(p j p < bp2) ,
where the inequality follows from the fact that bp1 < bp2 and F2 is a well-dened c.d.f. Putting
together the expressions above, it follows that
F1(p j p < bp1) > F2(p j p < bp2) .
Finally, note that
E(p1 j p1 < bp1) = Z bp1
p0
(1  F1(p j p < bp1))dp  p0 and
E(p2 j p2 < bp2) = Z bp1
p0
(1  F2(p j p < bp2))dp+ Z bp2bp1 (1  F2(p j p < bp2))dp  p0 .
It is then easy to see that E(p1 j p1 < bp1) < E(p2 j p2 < bp2).
Suppose now that Condition 2 does not hold. F h2 is continuous on [p
h
0 ; 1] so that F
h
2 (p) = F
h
2 (p j
p < 1), whereas F h1 is continuous on [p
h
0 ; 1), but has an atom at p = 1, 
h = 2(1   (k; k))=
[1   (1  ) (1  (k; k))]. Using the price c.d.f.s in appendix A.4, we can show that
F h1 (p j p < 1) =
F h1 (p)
1  h = F
h
1 (p)
1   (1  ) (1  (k; k))
1  (1  (k; k)) = F
h
2 (p) ,
and an argument similar to the one above applies as bph1 < 1 and h > 0.
A.6 Expected Prots with Biased Experts
Existence of a Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
Suppose rm 2 uses a mixed strategy b2. Then, the expected prot of rm 1 when choosing










2(k2 j p2 > p1)
!









































where the equivalence follows from @2(k1; k2)=@k1@k2 = 0. As @=@k1 < 0, we obtain
k1(p1) =
8>>>><>>>>:
k if 1  F b2 (p1   d) >  , p1 < bpb1
k if 1  F b2 (pb1   d) <  , p1 > bpb1
k; 8k 2 [k; k] if p1 = bpb1
;
where the threshold price bpb1 is implicitly dened by F b2 (bpb1 d) = 1 , whenever bpb1 d belongs
to T b2 , the support of F
b
2 .
Suppose rm 1 uses a mixed strategy b1. Then, the expected prot of rm 2 when choosing










1(k1 j p1 > p2)
!















A similar argument leads to the following result
k2(p2) =
8>>>><>>>>:
k if 1  F b1 (p2 + d) > 1   , p2 < bpb2
k if 1  F b1 (p2 + d) < 1   , p2 > bpb2
k; 8k 2 [k; k] if p2 = bpb2
;
where the threshold price bpb2 is implicitly dened by F b1 (bpb2 + d) = , whenever bpb2 + d belongs
to T b1 , the support of F
b
1 .
Expected Prots and Constant Prot Conditions
In this part, we present the expected prot expressions which underlie example 4 in sec-
tion 5: To do so, we adapt the main analysis to capture expert consumersbias towards the
prominent rms product.
If rm 1 chooses p 2 [p20 + d; bpb1); it associates this price with complexity level k. Then, its
expected prot is
b1(p; k) = pf(b2   F b2 (p  d))(k; k) + (1  b2)(k; k) + [b2(1  (k; k)) + (1  b2)(1  (k; k))]g
= p
h
1  F b2 (p  d)  (1  )(1  b2)=2
i
:
This expression is similar to (1), but biased expert consumers purchase from rm 1 if rm 2s








1  (1  )(1  b2)=2
i
and
limp%bpb1b1(p; k) = bpb1 h   (1  )(1  b2)=2i ;
where we use 1  F b2 (bpb1   d) = .
If rm 1 chooses p 2 [bpb1; 1), it associates this price with complexity level k. Then, its
expected prot is
b1(p;
k) = pf(b2   F b2 (p  d))(k; k) + (1  b2)(k; k) +
[b2(1  (k; k)) + (1  b2)(1  (k; k))]g
= pf(b2   F b2 (p  d))=2 + [b2=2 + (1  b2)]g .
As before this expression follows from adapting (A3) to reect the fact that rm 1 serves
(k; k) experts whenever the rival chooses the lowest complexity and a price higher than p  d.
Evaluating this expression at bpb1 and using 1   F b2 (bpb1   d) = , it can be checked that the
expected prot function is continuous at bpb1, i.e. b1(bpb1; k) = limp%bpb1b1(p; k). Moreover, when
p! 1,
limp%1b1(p; k) = [
b
2=2 + (1  b2)] :
The constant prot conditions of rm 1 lead to the following equations
(p20 + d)
h
1  (1  )(1  b2)=2
i
= [b2=2 + (1  b2)] and
bpb1 h   (1  )(1  b2)=2i = [b2=2 + (1  b2)] :
If rm 2 chooses p 2 [p20; bpb1   d], it associates the price with k. In this range p + d < bpb1,
and rm 2s expected prot is
b2(p; k) = pf(k; k)(b1   F b1 (p+ d)) + (1  b1)(k; k) +
(1  ) [b1(1  (k; k)) + (1  b1)(1  (k; k))]g
= p
h
b1   F b1 (p+ d)) + (1  b1)=2 + (1  ) (1  b1)=2
i
:
This expression adapts (A6) with the di¤erence that biased experts purchase from rm 2 if the
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rival chooses k and a price above p+ d. Evaluating this expression at p20 and bpb1  d, we obtain
b2(p
2




b1 + (1  b1)=2 + (1  ) (1  b1)=2
i
and
b2(bpb1   d; k) = (bpb1   d) h(1  b1)=2 + (1  ) (1  b1)=2i :
If rm 2 chooses p 2 [bpb1   d; 1  d], it associates the price with k. In this range p+ d > bpb1,
and rm 2s expected prot is
b2(p; k) = pf(k; k)(1  F b1 (p+ d)) + (1  ) [b1(1  (k; k)) + (1  b1)(1  (k; k))]g
= p
h
(1  F b1 (p+ d)) + (1  ) (1  b1)
i
=2 :
Firm 2 can only serve the expert consumers when rm 1 prices above p + d, in which case
there are (k; k) informed consumers. It can be checked that rms 2 expected prot function
is continuous at bpb1   d and, evaluating at 1  d, we obtain
b2(1  d; k) = (1  d)[(1  F b1 (1)) + (1  ) (1  b1)]=2 ;
where (1  F b1 (1))  0 (if the inequality is strict, then rm 1 has a mass point at p = 1).
Finally, if rm 2 chooses p = 1, it associates this price with k and its expected prot is
b2(1;
k) = (1  )[b1=2 + 1  b1] :
The constant prot conditions of rm 1 lead to the following equations
p20
h
b1 + (1  b1)=2 + (1  ) (1  b1)=2
i
= (1  )[b1=2 + 1  b1] and
(bpb1   d) h(1  b1) + (1  ) (1  b1)i =2 = (1  )[b1=2 + 1  b1] :
The equations above determine p20; bpb1; b1; and b2. Although the closed-form solutions for
arbitrary d and  are cumbersome, it is straightforward to solve the system of equations for
given values of d and , as shown in example 4.
Numerical Example and Further Discussion
In example 4, we focus on an equilibrium where T b1 = [p
2
0 +d; 1] and rm 1 associates k with
prices on [p20 +d; bpb1) and k with prices on [bpb1,1], and T b2 = [p20; 1 d][f1g and rm 2 associates
k with prices on [p20; 1   d] and k with p = 1. For these mixed strategies to be part of an
equilibrium, consistency requires bpb2 = 1  d, p20 + d < bpb1 < 1  d, p20 > 0, F b2 (bpb1  d) = (1  ),
F b1 (bpb2 + d) = , b1 = F b1 (bpb1) 2 (0; 1) and b2 = F b2 (1  d) 2 (0; 1). Using rmsexpected prots
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presented above and the equilibrium constant prot conditions, we obtain p20; bpb1; b1; and b2.
These can be used to identify rmsprots, and price c.d.f.s. For expositional simplicity, we
focus on a case where (k; k) = 0. As (k; k) = 1, under the assumption that @2=@k1@k2 = 0,
this implies that (k; k) = 1=2.
Example 4 Let (k; k) = 1, (k; k) = :5, and (k; k) = 0. Suppose  = :7 and d = :1.
There exists an equilibrium where rms 1 and 2 choose k with probability b1 = :3 and 
b
2 = :7,
respectively. The two rms randomize on prices according to the following c.d.f.s, which are
illustrated in Figure 4.
F b1 (p) =

F b1L(p) = :75  :255=(p  d) for p 2 [p20 + d; bpb1)
F b1H(p) = 1:2  :5=(p  d) for p 2 [bpb1; 1] and
F b2 (p) =
8<:
F b2L(p) = 1  :45=(p+ d) for p 2 [p20; bpb1)
F b2H(p) = 1:6  :9=(p+ d) for p 2 [bpb1; 1  d]
1 for p = 1
,
where p20 = :35, p
2
0 + d = :45, bpb1 = :65, and 1  d = :9. Firm 1 makes prot b1 = :45 and rm
2 makes prot b2 = :255.






Figure 4: Firmsprice c.d.f.s for  = :7 and d = :1 with biased experts. F b1 (p) is the blue line
and F b2 (p) is the red line. The dashed lines correspond to prices associated with k.
It is easy to see that in the example the price c.d.f.s are well dened. The consistency
requirements are satised, F b2 (bpb1   d) = 1   = :3, F b2 (1  d) = b2 = :7, F b1 (1) =  = :7, and
F b1 (bpb1) = b1 = :3. Furthermore, conditional on choosing the lowest complexity, the expected
price of rm 1 is
E(p1 j p1 < bpb1) = Z 1
0
(1  F b1 (p j p < bpb1))dp = p20 + d+ Z bpb1
p20+d
(1  F b1L(p)=b1)dp = :54 ,
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while that of rm 2 is
E(p2 j p2 < 1  d) =
Z 1
0










2)dp = :6 .
Like in the benchmark model, consumersbias in favor of the prominent rm is consistent with
the average prices, conditional on these being associated with the lowest complexity level, k.
This is the case although, when the experts are willing to pay a prominence premium, the
prominent rms lowest possible price is strictly larger than that of its rival. In example 4, the
experts never pay more than p2 = 1  d for the less prominent product. The equilibrium there
is consistent with an environment where prominence-biased experts are willing to pay up to
v1 = 1 for the prominent product but no more than v2 = 1  d for the less prominent one.
Example 4 also highlights some di¤erences from the benchmark model with unbiased ex-
perts. In particular, with biased experts, in the mixed strategy equilibrium both rms may
have a mass point at the monopoly price and the less prominent rm sets this price with higher
probability than the rival (i.e., in the example 1 F b1 (1) = :355 and 1 F b2 (1) = :3). Although
there is a positive probability of a tie at price p = 1, the less prominent rm cannot improve its
market share by slightly undercutting and neither can the rival. So, the reasoning in Lemma
4 does not apply when d > 0. Moreover, the supports of the price c.d.f.s are not identical and
the c.d.f. of the less prominent rm has a gap.
A full characterization of the equilibria in the model with biased experts is beyond the
scope of this section. However, there are also other equilibria. For instance, if d > d^ =
[1   (1   )(1   (k; k))], there exists a pure strategy equilibrium where k1 = k, k2 = k,
and p1 = p2 = 1. Firmsprots are then 1(k; k) = 1   (1   )(1   (k; k)) and 2(k; k) =
(1  )(1  (k; k)). Given these equilibrium prices, rm 1 (rm 2) cannot increase its market
share by increasing k1 (decreasing k2). If rm 2 deviates to pd2 = (1   ")  (1   d) and
k2 2 [k; k), its deviation prot is d2 = (1   ")[1   (1   (k; k2)))] and d2 > 2(k; k) i¤ " <
1  (1  )(1  (k; k))=[1  (1  (k; k2))]  d^. Consistency requires d < ". So if d > d^, @ "
s.t. d2 > 2(k; k2) for k2 2 [k; k).
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